The Challenge of Governance of India Today by Morris, Sebastian













The Challenge of Governance in India Today 
 
Sebastian Morris 






















Indian Institute of Management 
Ahmedabad 380015 
INDIA 
The main objective of the working paper series of the IIMA is to help faculty 
members test out their research findings at the pre-publication stage 
 Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  1 









The tendency to ascribe to bad or inadequate governance the failure of development 
policy, has become nearly universal. It seems development finance institutions (DFIs), 
multilateral agencies (MLAs) like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and 
policy makers have all come to the `conclusion' that 'poor governance', like a 
multiplicative factor, reduces even the best policy and prescription to naught. One can 
dispute this contention in many ways. Since all acts of omission and commission, poor 
design of institutions, their improper working can be considered as governance failure, 
the contention is neither an explanation of development failure in a causal sense, nor 
particularly  useful from the point of bringing about change in economic performance  
(or even of governance). The notion of governance failure has to be narrowed down 
and  carefully understood. As a truism it has the danger of  masking our inadequate 
understanding of societies and economies, or even our unwillingness to understand the 
specific features of particular societies. Talking about poor governance without worrying 
deeply about the conditions that engender the same may also hide an unwillingness to 
examine the policies and development approaches, critically. In this paper we finally 
come to the conclusion that the leverage point for correcting  governance  failure lie in 
policy and politics . In a more restricted sense of being able to set up the correct 
institutional arrangements, rules and incentives for economic behaviour, actions 
focussed on governance has a special autonomy and a more limited role.  
 
This paper attempts to delineate that role today in India. In the introduction we raise 
the conceptual and historical difficulties with the notion that sees governance failure as 
the cause of poor economic performance.  Next we discuss why there are certain 
                                            
1 Email: morris@iimahd.ernet.in/ Ph: 079-6308093/6324862/ Fx: 079-6427896/Mb: 
9824232121; This paper is slated to appear as Chapter 2 of IIR(2002). 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to delineate the possible role of goverance oriented reform in India 
today. We raise conceptual and historical difficulties with the notion that sees 
governance failure as the cause of poor economic performance.  We discuss why there 
are certain regularities in the occurance of good governance, distinguishing the same 
from 'functional governance' which aids and abets industrialisation. Next we go on to  
discuss the interlikages between institutions, economic development and  governance in 
India, and why internal attempts at reform thus far have failed.. Finally we bring out the 
current failures in governance that are actionable and suggest that they are largely 
corrected by changes in economic policy and some intitutional initiatives.  Attention to 
governance as such is warranted only to build organisations and initiatives for 
commercialisation and privatisation, and for appropriate changes in the law and in the 
development of frameworks for regulation and contracting out. 
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regularities in the occurance of good governance, distinguishing the same from 
'functional governance' which aids and abets industrialisation. Next we go on to discuss 
the interlikages between institutions, economic development and  governance in India, 
and why internal attempts at reform thus far have failed.. Finally we bring out the 
current failures in governance that are actionable and suggest that they are largely 
corrected by changes in economic policy and some intitutional initiatives.  Attention to 
governance as such is warranted only to build organisations and initiatives for 
commercialisation and privatisation, and for appropriate changes in the law and in the 
development of frameworks for regulation and contracting out. 
 
 
Governance - Cause or Effect 
 
Governance through the system (of government and its parastatals) is more often than 
not, not the 'leverage' point for change, but has to be effected by simultaneous changes 
in other dimensions of society - economic policy, politics, and law.  The contrary 
position only begs the question since how does one bring about better governance than 
by appeal to 'political will' a much abused term? 
 
It is important and of utmost relevance that the 19th Century despite no MLAs or DFIs 
saw many more countries making their industrial transformation
2, than the Twentieth. 
Indeed, the only successful independent transformations that can be said to have 
begun unambiguously in the Twentieth Century are those of the East Asian Tigers 
(South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Thailand and possibly Malaysia), where the role 
of MLAs was marginal at best. The Soviet industrialisation which was successful has 
now fallen and is in the process of acquiring  a more sustainable capitalist character. 
These facts should open the minds of policy makers to the possibility that DFI's and 
MLAs may have been quite wrong in their approach to development Certainly the hope 
that with actions at the international level, development can be engineered faster than 
otherwise has been dashed. Otherwise the twentieth century should have seen nearly 
all countries (except perhaps the African) to being well on their way to the industrial 
transformation. It is important to note that good governance as conventionally 
understood - fair, transparent and accountable - was not a necessary characteristic  of  
successful countries  at every point in their history. 
 
Corrupt Societies Have Also Transformed 
 
The US in the twenties or earlier was a very corrupt society. So is China today. Despite 
that it grows very fast. So have many other societies been during some part of their 
history
3.  
                                            
2 The industrial transformation, the second major social revolution after man emerged is 
fundamentally so  and without it no society (other than through rents and transfers) can 
aspire to high and increasing incomes. There is nothing like sidestepping 
industrialisation for a society of any decent size  despite the opportunity to leap frog 
and avoid particular industries, that the emergence of the services sector as one in its 
own right  brings about.  
3 We know that  industrialisation is a messy process; and good governance, as we 
understand it today was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Indeed, the early Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  3 
Corruption in societies does present a pattern of sorts. With a critical level of 
development it seems to fall, sometimes very dramatically. Corruption came down 
rather suddenly in the US after the Twenties. The jailing of Al Capone in 1932 may have 
been the turning point in the change in the US to a relatively corruption free society. 
Today, China is putting down corruption with a firm hand
4. Taiwan and Korea today 
value cleanliness in public life far more than they did in their immediate past. The early 
years of industrialisation do seem to be more corruption ridden and prone to 
governance failures than the post-transformation phase. So is it the case that the 
importance or otherwise of governance, and possibly of its dysfunctionality (or 
otherwise) an aspect of the phase of development? And so negating a priori, any 
universally valid relationship between 'good governance' and development? 
 
Another Word for State Failure? 
 
The Gerschenkron notion that the later a country industrialises the 'greater' has been 
the role of the state (Gerschenkron, Alexander, 1966), is again a historical regularity 
that has held up to date. So far there has not been a single violation of this regularity. 
Therefore, is the insistence on good governance as a pre-condition to the efficacy of 
development policy a round about (and confusing) way of admitting the Gerschenkron 
theses by main stream economists? When the insistence on governance is so intense as 
it is today, then logicall the state of which it is an aspect
5  ought to be at the centre 
stage. The debate on state and market failure has led to deep insights into the factors 
of success in East Asia, and failure elsewhere. State failure  has been cogently 
developed in the literature, wherein the class base of the society, the particular 
orientation of the bureucaracy, and the policies pursued, and the appropriateness of 
economic instruments of control  have been related to present cogent stories. We draw 
much from this literature. 
 
 
Prosperity Inequality and Governance 
  
 
Today the 'causation' is assumed to be from governance to development. It may, and 
often does, run the other way too, as numerous examples from history will show. China 
after going thorough a phase of high corruption, poor (but nevertheless functional) 
governance is now cracking down on corruption. Is it that with 'middle incomes' the 
value of good governance has gone up? And hence its pursuit? Similarly, was the 
sudden change away from corruption in the US during the 1920s the result of economic 
compulsions arising out of the high and wide spread growth of the `roaring twenties'.  
 
                                                                                                                              
period of industrial transformation has typically been one of contests, and class 
struggles, wherein 'rent' or plunder are barely distinguishable from capital. 
 
4 Over a few thousand corrupt officials and people have been jailed or sentenced to die 
during the last few years in China, on charges of corruption. See Box on Corruption in 
China. See also Zhao Dengju (2000).  
5 Even corporate governance is determined through frameworks, policies and actions of 
the state. Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  4 
As incomes rise for all with the industrial transformation, and when the bulk of the 
people cross a certain level of income (and are satiated in a basic sense), their ability to 
be concerned about immediate 'non-economic' aspects of life - relationships, 
orderliness, access to public facilities and fairness improves. Whereas below this level 
the struggle is for survival. With a decent living people's ability to resist  the 'unfairness' 
and waste in public bodies improves. In China and South Korea with very little 
inequality of incomes such a phase has come very suddenly.  
 
In South Asia and Latin America with pronounced income inequalities even when the 
rich are well beyond that threshold level of income most others are not, so that there is 
no point in time when a sudden change is discernable.  Visible poverty coexists with 
affluence. Ghettos, a vast services sector, urban sprawls and slums along with isolated 
and protected private clean spaces result. 'Good governance' in such situations of 
extreme deprivation may then merely mean states and public institutions being 
responsible to the rich and the upper classes, and so may be highly oppressive on the 
poor, who are in the majority. Standard notions of the dimensions of good governance - 
participatory, transparent, and accountable - may be limiting. Only propertied citizens, 
(but not to people in general)
6 may be able to take advantage of such good 
governance. The aspect of class is of particular concern in India because of the extreme 
inequality of incomes. It brings in a whole new dimension to governance. It makes any 
meaningful characterisation of governance inseparable from the nature of the state and 
its class basis. Even in democracies where theoretically the poor have the same political 
rights and privileges as the rich, the economic rules to corrupt and distort, to ritualise 
many political processes like participation. Stability, to such discordant societies is 
provided by an 'escape route' for sections of the politically ambitious (climbers) even 
among the poor. Thus, powerful 'big-men' in democratic Kenya, India or Bangladesh 
quickly amass wealth by controlling the levers of power. And this small window that 
allows a few (outside the elite) to convert political power into wealth has been well 
recognised as a characteristic feature of such societies
7. That process, an important 
aspect of which is corruption of public offices is very visible, attracts media attention 
and is much discussed. And derided and felt to be a blot and a shame on society. It is 
actually a process important to the survival and continuation of the elites' hold over a 
vastly in-egalitarian society. This kind of politics cannot be corrected by urging 
politicians not to be corrupt.  As law makers it is easy for them to create laws with 
loopholes that make the space for them to indulge in corruption. The cure actually lies 
in growth and development, which in taking people above a certain level of income 
quickly would create the right atmosphere and basis  to stand against corruption.
8 
                                            
6 Our contention is that, therefore growth which takes all people above that survival 
level of income has to have primacy over all else in capitalist society, as the goal of 
policy and practice in all poor countries. 
7 Mamdani, Mahmood (1976), Leys, Colin (1975), Shivji, Issa (1976) 
8 One may ask: How can growth take place when such politicians  stand in the way of 
good policy and its implementation? While there is no doubt some influence of this 
corrupt behaviour on the policy and economic management, our contention is that at 
this juncture, all that the corrupt politician demand is an 'illegal' share. It is possible for 
wise policy to result in high growth , so that the costs of accomodation can be borne. 
The 'rents' that they would collect while no doubt unfair and possibly illegal would if 
invested make this 'outside' politician a capitalist. The resulting governance and state Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  5 
 
Meaningful good governance is very difficult in such discordant societies.  In such 
societies which is also truly democratic (like India) (a rarity since discordance is usually 
managed by authoritarian regimes), the fact of political corruption  and anomie, should 
not lead to the policy maker losing hope. The point really is to look beyond corruption, 
to the leverage points for change in society. These lie principally in getting the initial 
conditions right - a population with all having some (minimum) endowments, so that he 
can participate as both a producer and a consumer. Today that would mean land reform 
or security of tenure. It would also mean appropriate macroeconomic policy  that gives 
primacy to growth. In short policy and politics become the drivers. In a more limited 
sense though institutional change, design of better organisations and rules are an 
opportunity today in India, since there is a broad consensus that reforms should 
continue. Only with a more egalitarian income distribution can governance hope to be 
both functional and good. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN INDIA  
 
 
Prior Institutional Development in India 
 
India which started out with nearly all the institutions (largely inherited from the British) 
current in advanced societies, but limited to serve only a miniscule proportion of its 
population, failed in the apparently 'easy task of simply extending the domain and 
access' of these institutions to the whole of society. Today we know that in India such 
extension has been more formal than real. In contrast, East Asian societies starting out 
without the 'institutional benefit' of  the 'colonial yoke', was able to create institutions as 
they went along and as the need arose. This raises the question: Can the early 
existence and growth of institutions, much before their 'need' in an economic sense, 
prove premature and reduce the prospects of the transformation. Possibly yes, if the 
history of South Asia in the second half of the 20
th Century is any indication. 
 
The Failure of India 
 
India had all the ingredients by way of 'rules', institutions and organisations in spheres 
such as law, politics, participation, administration and governance, which few other non-
industrial countries had. It also opted for universal franchise and a 'fair and true' 
democracy, which meant that most of the inherited institutions and more had to be 
extended to cover the entire population. Did the costs of such extension prove 
backbreaking for the immature economy? Could these have in any case been avoided? 
We must recognise the massive bureaucratic overburden that has resulted, with the 
economy having to support an extensive state apparatus that in form is concerned with 
institutional development
9.  
                                                                                                                              
system  would be functional but not fare. Thus we would caution those who want to 
change governance to work through the economic. 
9 Yet, there is no denying that had economic growth been as rapid and broad based as 
was envisaged by the planners and the founding fathers of the nation, then this burden 
may perhaps have been not as onerous as it is today. Could the prior institutional 
development then have then been an asset? Perhaps so, and in that case India may Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  6 
 
India because of its 'failed' economy cannot in reality (although in form the claim can be 
made) of being successful even in the political front. The political and social institutions 
tend to show the form of success and correctness but not the content and substance: 
"Constitutionally provided" decentralisation but negated by government rules, orders 
processes and controls, and overstaffing; caste equality enshrined in the constitution 
but violated every hour in some corner of the country. Equality of opportunity, but poor 
children out of school, and others not so poor exploited in Bihar and UP by a 'rapacious' 
private sector because public schooling has all but collapsed. Indeed, an entire 
enterprise has evolved within and outside government whose task is to manage the 
contradictions between the formal political and social development on the one hand, 
and slow economic development on the other, and the resulting non-realisation of 
political and social development in substance. Thus for the state it is important to tell 
the intelligensia and the middle classes that it (the government) is doing something 
about poverty and the environment; that it provides scholarships; that it has hundreds 
of special and targeted programmes, that there are many thousands of NGOs working 
in the villages and elsewhere, and that there are free hospitals; free water supply; and 
that all are equal before the law. In truth though despite all these efforts India has very 
slow growth in per capita income barely doubling over a thirty year period. (And not 
because of a high population growth as many believe to be). It also has one of the 
worst records with respect to the environment. Bright young boys and girls are 
systematically excluded from good education given its highly elitist character (despite 
the activities of charitable and religious organisations). The leakages from government 
programmes are so large, ranging from a minimum of 30% to as high as 98%, that 
such programmes are more usefully (and correctly) seen as programmes that serve to 
buy up potential dissent among the excluded and deprived. Despite the 'free' hospitals 
people even the poor spend vast sums on medical care, the health status and morbidity 
of the Indian is among the worst in the world. We have tragically (and shamefully) the 
highest incidences of avoidable diseases like blindness and mental retardation due to 
vitamin deficiencies (!), leprosy, TB, typhoid, malaria, rheumatic heart injuries to name 
just a few. Suspects (when they have no contacts within the police bureaucracy or 
higher up) are regularly beaten black and blue, since the Indian police is unaware of 
any other method than 'confession as the queen of evidence', while drunken driving by 
rich brats resulting in deaths go unpunished. The cops themselves help in erasing 
evidence! 
 
The institutional school would explain economic performance in terms of institutional 
inadequacies or their lack. It is true that the two are intertwined. And any snapshot 
picture of the situation of poor economic performance would reveal inadequate and 
missing institutions.  But this does not mean that institutional failure was a cause of 
poor economic performance. In fact poor economic performance, which made 
competing  groups and interests focus their attention on how the 'cake waas to be 
divided' i.e. on redistribution  rather than growth and transformation, lead to the 
populist politics and the corruption that has now virtually destroyed many institutions. 
We will examine how given the mess, the attempts to correct the same through 
                                                                                                                              
well have been able to complete both its economic, and social and political 
transformations simultaneously! Today East Asia (including China with its economic 
transformation just round the corner) await their political and social transformations 
with a very good chance of completing both. Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  7 
'institutional efforts' have usually failed in the past. Nevertheless in a limited sense, and 
because of reform having made significant progress, it has created the space for 
institutional change and governance inprovements to be succeed. With time if nothing is 
done, that  window of opportunity would close. 
 
 
FAILURE OF ENDOGENOUS ATTEMPTS IN INDIA 
 
Thus the first Administrative Reforms Committee under LK Jha made very valuable 
recommendations even though in the light of present day understanding of the 
bureaucracy they look rather staid. They have the limitation of being purely an 
administrative approach to improve administration, rather than any major shift such as 
bringing in an increased role for the market. Nevertheless most of the recommendations 
were not taken up and the few that were, were ritualised to a point where no real 
difference was made. Similarly there is a Department of Administrative Reforms and 
Public Grieviencies. What they do is hardly known to citizens or even to most 
government officials. 
 
Similarly other administrative and organisational reform has been attempted many 
times in India without much success, pointing to the entrenched nature of the 
dysfunctionalities, and their basis in the nature of the state, and the overriding 
dominance of the bureaucracy without a concomitant accountability
10. The measures 
recommended for change, whatever the intentions or assumptions of their original 
designers, mutated and got ritualised to end up reinforcing the mess that was sought to 
be overcome. MoUs (Memoranda of Understanding signed between Public Sector 
Undertakings (PSUs) and government, the mechanism of the holding company as a 
buffer between PSUs and government were all instituted to reduce dysfunctional 
interference of the government in PSUs, and thereby to give mangers the requsite 
autonomy and accountability for performance improvement. They worked elsewhere, 
notably in France, but in India they got ritualised and continue to exit on paper with no 
real effect whatsover in distancing PSUs from government. See Box: Institutional Efforts 
for PSU Management Fail. 
 
 
Political Economy of Design Failure 
 
Many other 'fine institutions', well crafted have deteriorated. Examples would be the 
state schools education machinery, health 'delivery' systems and government purchase 
(including defense purchases
11). Why? Deficiency in design is only a part, probably a 
small part of the explanation
12. It is more likely that the overall environment of 
corruption and rent seeking, very little need for accountability given the nature of 
defined government processes and rules, the politics of displacement between authority 
                                            
10 The lack of accountability resulting from the structure of the bureaucracy, the civil 
servants significant power, and their relationship with the political executive is well 
understood. We cover some of this when we discuss the failure of the Panchayats later. 
11 This is not based on Tehelka, but on the author's own professional study of the 
system of purchases for the armed forces of such things as uniforms, tentage etc. 
12 The solution though may still be in correction of these deficiencies when there is a 
strong motivation  (pressure and now) and willingness to change! Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  8 
and responsibility are the underlying root causes. Also the open invitation to corruption 
as in 'lowest cost tender', without feedback and punishment of errant bidders, no 
processes to blacklist such vendors have been responsible for heinous crimes being 
committed in public hospitals. This has been brought out by the Lentin Commission 
Report. Correcting such "bloomers" in design involve change at the core of government 
processes, hardly possible without a movement, and strong economic and political 
pressures to correct them. 
 
Dysfunctionalities of Worthy Institutions 
 
Similarly, in the context of public management we do have the institution of the 
Controller & Auditor General (CAG) whose job is to selectively audit the use of public 
money, i.e. inter alia perform 'CAG' audit of PSUs
13. Its functioning has rarely brought 
out cases of the big misappropriations and corruption. But most managers would 
generally agree that it has restricted entrepreneurial initiatives in PSUs, to the point of 
rendering managers impotent. Despite audit, the corrupt can always get away by 
covering their tracks.  Today Vigilance has emerged as a major constraint to 
entrepreneurial initiative in the PSUs. It is not so much the case that the institutions of 
the Controller & Auditor General and the Chief Vigilance Officer (CVO) and the roles 
they play are per se dysfunctional in a democracy. But given the failure of the other 
systems, that have resulted in pervasive governments' interference at the operational 
and managerial levels in PSUs. Neither audit nor vigilance is able to work without at the 
same time creating large costs within the system. 
 
The general point is that mere institutional forms, even the best forms, without 
underlying change in the politics and in the environment of the organisations whose 
improvement is sought, is of no avail. To be effective the very existence of the 
organisation and the status quo has to be threatened
14. So in a policy sense addressing 
governance directly without at the same time creating the political and economic 
conditions is pointless and a mere ritual. (We will argue that unlike in the past, some 
sectors today those conditions exist or are just about to be realised, so that worrying 
about governance and design at this juncture is useful. Thus liberalisation, the 
budgetary squeeze on state owned enterprise all create the right conditions for 
correcting design errors). 
 
MODE OF SUBSIDISATION AND CORRUPTION 
 
The reform  process thus far has eliminated the vast rents that were generated through 
licenses, controls and shortages. This does not  not mean that rents are not generated 
today. Poor administration of subsidies, contracts not in the public interest, and residual 
shortages especially in infrastructural services  continue to remain feeding corruption 
and governance failure. We conclude the section arguing that only with the policies that 
                                            
13 This is in addition to commercial audit under Company Law (statutory audit). 
14 This is a fairly universal phenomenon. Large organisations public and private (when 
not run by a small group or an individual), or in other words, bureaucratic organisations 
have rarely responded to opportunity. It is 'threats' that have had success in bringing 
about organisational change. The detailed case study of the Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI), U.K. brings out all the nuances (Pettigrew, Andrew ..............). Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  9 
removes the scope for rents and with the correct modes of delivery of subsidies can 
governance improve. 
  
Today subsidies are under attack, and there is much consciousness among reformers 
that they need to go. I had argued that more than sharp reduction in subsidies a 
"stepping stone solution is called for." In shifting from the existing modes of 
subsidisation to direct subsidisation not only can the leakages be plugged and the 
condition for governance improvements be realised, but reform can become decoupled 
from the bind of subsidies. Herein we take the case of electricity and argue the point 
already made, in greater detail.  
 
The discussion on the oil sector (Box: Creating Governance Failure in the Oil Sector) 
brings out the mess that has come out of the current mode of diesel and kerosene 
subsidisation.  In moving from current modes to direct subsidies, there would be much 
support for politicians who truly represent the interests of farmers. It is in the realm of 
political possibility. Nothing could help major infrastructural areas like electricity, water 
and irrigation then direct subsidisation. 
 
'Agency Failure' Due to Different Prices 
 
The current mode of subsidisation (financing the deficit of SEBs by transfers or simply 
allowing them to mount) creates an 'invitation to corruption that is surprisingly not 
universally recognised. Thus the SEB managers report high T&D losses when a large 
part, usually more than half, is theft or leakage, where the manager himself is involved 
in under the table sales to usually small industrial consumers, and rich households using 
air conditioners as in Delhi. Similarly, SEBs over report auxiliary consumption. Perhaps 
more importantly the manager over reports sales to the subsidised sectors when in 
reality he would have sold to industrial consumers, and created rent equal to the 
quantity so sold times the price difference
15. This is a situation of rents with losses 
(Pandey, Ajay 2001). The leakages that so result are very large. Thus, in Gujarat in 
1995, had the leakages been plugged, the GEB should have shown a profit of +20% on 
equity rather than a loss of 20% on equity! In other words unlike the belief of many 
consultants, the problem with electricity prices is not that on the average they are very 
low, but of irrational pricing. A pricing which creates the 'open invitation to corruption' 
in the delivery systems. Both irrationality in the price structure and the leakages can be 
stopped with direct subsidisation. 
 
Direct Subsidy and Reform 
 
With direct subsidisation the electricity company (SEB or its inheritor) sees uniform 
prices (regulated or part determined in the market for wholesale power), since the 
subsidised customers would pay with coupons (encashable) and with cash above their 
entitlements. All zones or circles except the very remote and sparse ones would become 
viable for private investment, and reform could take off overnight in various ways - 
reform by mere corporatisation of SEBs, by privatisation of distribution-cum-generating 
companies, or through markets for wholesale power. The company, within the ceiling 
imposed by the regulator, could offer differential prices based on the need to maximise 
                                            
15 These were brought out in detail in Morris, S. (2000), Chapter 6.2 in the Morris, S. 
(2000). Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  10 
his profit. Possible outcomes are low prices for agriculturists since many of them would 
not mind consuming electricity at off-peak hours. Similarly industrial customers with the 
ability to shift demands to off-peak hours could get electricity at very low prices. 
 
Invitation to governance failure and corruption 
 
In the IIR2001 I had argued that reform in the electricity sector has to start with direct 
subsidisation of the farmer and other subsidised sections. Direct subsidisation was 
expoused as a system whereby farmers and others once identified could be regularly 
issued coupons through banks and post offices equal to their fixed entitlements, 
allowing them to purchase electricity from distribution companies. As a result, it is 
possible to separate the subsidisation and reform of the sector (otherwise caught in a 
Catch 22 situation), and address both issues independently. Politically it makes sense on 
the part of reformers to not ask for a removal of subsidies - always very difficult - but to 
attempt to right target subsidies. Such a change in strategy would bring the politically 
mighty farmers on the side of reform. And the vast gains out of reform would allow the 
burden of subsidies to actually go down. It was argued that such a move is not only 
desirable but also necessary for reform to make progress. The current proposals to 
directly make good the subsidy claims of State Electricity Boards (SEBs) or their 
inheritor organisations obviously creates an incentive to over claim and over report 
subsidies, which finance departments or regulators can hardly cross check. This motive 
would remain even for private companies, even if they have a motive to reduce and 
plug leakages. The difference would be that leakages would have been internalised. 
Additionally, such subsidisation removes or minimises the distortions in the use of 
electricity. And we had also argued that if all farm subsidies are bundled and made 
available for various inputs, with the farmer exercising choice, then the vast distortions 
in the cropping pattern, in input use and especially in misuse of scarce water and land 
would be reduced or eliminated. The gain to the economy would be stupendous, and to 




With such a large 'arbitrage opportunity available to SEB managers, why should they 
not succumb to the temptation? Indeed if a few take advantage of the opportunity, with 
little or declining risks of getting caught, such corruption spreads like wild fire to 
become the dominant pattern, to appear almost like a characteristic or a propensity. 
'Indians are corrupt" or 'all government officials are corrupt', when indeed the problem 
is one of the system rather than at the individual level. No is the problem that of 
culture. So-called cultural `explanation' to
16 many things economic, is cultural in most 
cases vacuous, and cannot lead to a solution. 
 
 
Rents in Other Subsidies 
 
                                            
16 A 'cultural explanation' of corruption or governance failure can only lead to the 
impotent position of 'changing the culture', something practically impossible. As a 
process cultures change much after the economic has changed - rewards and 
punishments incentives information and control. 
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Besides these cases of electricity and oil retailing (See Box), there are many others of 
policy failure that have now resulted in powerful vested interests. Among them are 
food-subsidies through the so-called 'public distribution system', fertiliser subsidy, 
irrigation pricing. In all these it is not the desire to subsidise or provide the incentive per 
se that is the big problem, as much as the way it was done, i.e. of design. The failure is 
therefore intellectual rather than one of implementation, and as such the policy makers, 
or rather the detailers who are to be blamed. And here the responsibility falls squarely 
on the upper rungs of the bureaucracy. The politician in India has been forced to carry 
a lot more of the blame for the current mess, than is legitimately attributable to him. 
The bureaucrat and policy maker by their intellectual laziness bear responsibility for 
converting what would have been accommodation of various `legitimate' interest 
groups, into opportunities for rent and graft. Where the future opportunities for rent 
and graft anticipated and hence provided for as some would claim? Not really such a 
position would give too much foresight to the bureaucracy of the day. Talking to senior 
and now retired civil servants who were intimately involved in the electricity and fuel 
sectors, the mistakes were genuine. Correction though has now come up against the 
wall of vested interests. 
 
Distortions Don't Cancel 
 
This tendency to overcome rather than correct a past mistake, with another measure 
(which would therefore in due course become another mistake), is rampant to policy 
making in India. In fact, the system values officers within the bureaucracy who can 
provide such 'compensating solutions', a point I had made in the last IIR (p 9, 2001). 
This trap of 'overcoming' one distortion with another is so ingrained in our minds that 
we are not even conscious of the real options. Even the media is unable to step out of 
that paradigm. The intellectual architects of the mess of electricity pricing or fuel pricing 
now after their retirement continue to be very 'successful' advisers of reform creating 
further mess, (but sweeping them under the carpet) as they go along. The trifurcation 
of SEBs on paper merely to get an ADB loan, the Orissa model of reform, the current 
CNG solution to pollution in Delhi, the 'coverage of subsidisation' and 'subventions' to 
the GEB (and other boards) by the state governments are all examples of application of 
this approach. As we go along we would suffer their consequences. Thus it is obvious 
today that if direct subsidisation or better subsidy administration were to come about 
there would be a quantum improvement in governance. Similarly, in a market economy, 
interventions that recognise the constraints (and the opportunities) in the market would 
also result in major positive changes in the environment for the improvement of 
governance.  
 
SHORTAGES AND CORRUPTION 
 
Unlike in oil products or in electricity, the administered prices in other crucial products 
such as cement, paper, steel and non-ferrous materials were accompanied by control 
orders. Control orders served to manage the shortages that would be natural in non 
market prices. Thus 'approved' construction could hope to get steel and cement allotted 
at controlled prices, while the rest of the economy went either without these or had to 
pay ransom prices for these (other wise mundane) products. The resulting impact on 
the economy and society was dramatic. Governments had to develop the allocative 
machinery that was to do the job 'fairly' and also to appear to be 'fair'. The 
bureaucracies that came about to manage the shortages were very large. Thus in steel Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  12 
allocations alone, a few thousand people may have been involved. More importantly in 
vitiating the controls or the rationing system rents were created. The marginal value of 
housing is considerable in situations of shortage, and the rents which cement and steel 
traders could extract out of the middle classes who could afford to build houses were 
considerable.  
 
Licensed Shortages and License to Corrupt 
 
There was a time when nobody (other than institutions and public organisations) could 
get cement without a contact with someone in government, or by bribing officials. What 
was true of cement and steel was also true of many other basic materials like paper, 
furnace oil, many chemicals, which were administratively priced and allocated. In other 
goods and services which were also controlled (either on price or capacity or both), but 
where automatic rationing through queuing was possible, the scope for petty corruption 
was enormous. Numerous examples come to mind - scooters till the mid-eighties, 
railway tickets, food until 1972, movie tickets till the end of the seventies. Telephone 
connections till the liberalisation of the 90s, electricity connections even today in rural 
areas and small towns, water supply and sewerage services, bus services. Where the 
markets could adjust with fancy prices, such as in imported goods the damage to the 
society was perhaps limited to the rents that were generated out of a license awarded 
to a favoured few, or the returns to smuggling. It is where rationing or queuing was 
necessary that the greatest damage was done, since all people waiting in the queue 
would have an incentive to try and get some of the product by bribery if he could afford 
to. The administrative machinery would be able to extract rents since the cost of 
waiting or denial, to many, would be considerable. Such conditions when they continue 
long enough can corrupt practically all in society, except the `stupidly' honest person.  
See Box: The Indian Experience 
 
Most of us do what our neighbours do, which is why accents, trends and fashions are 
possible in society. If a person's probability to commit a corrupt act is a positive function 
of the number of his friends and neighbours who are corrupt, then in a situation with 
vast rent opportunity, long queues and shortages, it is only a matter of time before 
public moral standards fall and a so called 'corrupt culture' emerges. Nearly all Indians 
would have given a bribe to a train ticket examiner or a village talati. The connected 
elite of Delhi would not even think that they are doing something wrong when they fix 
up for a fee somebody's business with the government. 
 
As the control and allocation raj gave way in most manufacturing sectors, the problem 
of shortages and denial has been overcome. The cement decontrol that happened in 
the mid-eighties overnight brought about massive expansion in output, lower prices and 
competition in the sector. Today, personal bank credit, which was officially completely 
denied (or one had to find an accommodating bank manager who would pass off the 
personal loan as a lending to the small scale industry), is now available for the asking.  
 
Infrastructural Shortages and Denial Remain 
 
But in many infrastructural services, especially those consumed by the poor, the denial 
and shortages remain. It is easy to say that second class rail travel is under priced and 
hence there are shortages. But true costs of passenger travel may not be substantially 
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since much peak season travelling is need based. In railways, bus services etc, where 
downward price elasticities are low (upward, travel for pleasure, price elasticities may 
well be large). Some is true of drinking water. In such sectors the adjustments are 
made through inhuman overcrowding and congestion that the 'unreserved' traveler on 
railways and buses has to bear. Petty corruption naturally result since advance planning 
by definition cannot work for all when there is a shortage. Even more importantly in all 
municipal services but especially school education, water and sewerage, sanitation, 
street lighting, and roads denial and shortages continue, and result in corruption and 
neighbourhood competition. Many of these services being basic can therefore be 
exploited by the 'unscrupulous' (goons who organise slums, provide `protection' and 
regulate water and toilet access) or touts in railway booking offices, to extract rents out 
of the poor and those denied. Price elasticities are very low over a certain range, so 
price adjustments when possible are very large, enough to have (negative) income 
effects on the poor. Thus water market prices in areas of cities denied with adequate 
municipal supplies, slums and the outskirts have prices almost close to the willingness 
to pay and often typically many times the cost of production of these services.  
 
State Failure Compounds Market Failure 
 
Education, especially quality school education extracts large rents from all including the 
poor and the lower middle classes. A small shortage of a good 'english teaching' 
schooling makes parents run from pillar to post and victims of donation taking and high 
fees in the 'new' schools. An earlier era of 'chauvinistic', rather than need based 
expansion of public schools, and near total state failure on this aspect in Bihar and 
much of UP has ensured such a state of affairs. 
 
Creating the 'Culturally' Corrupt Society 
 
Unlike the high corruption of the contracts variety - a la Bofors or Tehelka - the 
corruption that an economy of shortages and administrative (non-transparent 
allocation) breeds is widespread and becomes almost universal. Even children are not 
free from experience of corruption, as when a tiny tot realises that her parents had to 
give a hefty donation to the headmistress, or use her big uncle's influence to get her to 
the school. In society this petty corruption is often used to justify more dastardly acts of 
corruption. Thus an IPS officer when after a few years of struggle to keep himself above 
the morass, finally gives up, he would use the argument that even his upright brother 
had to depend upon him to get that railway ticket or that ration card. MLAs and MPs 
have quotas for gas and petrol bunk allocations, and earlier for telephone connection. 
There are 'VIP' quotas on trains, quotas for certain worthy categories of citizens like 
doctors and shopkeepers. And higher level employees of organisations providing 
services have their own quotas to allocate. When these are priced and sold for a fee as 
in the case of gas connections, then the damage to the moral and social fabric of the 
society is less, than when administrative discretion is actually used. Imagine a mother 
desperate to visit her ill son in a distant part of the country having no option but to 
cringe before a politician or a bureaucrat to get that emergency quota released. Such 
processes only reinforce the notion that only 'contacts and administrative and political 
power' matter in society, and therefore not one's work and rights. The notion of rights 
gets therefore muted, in all meaningful spaces of one's ordinary existence. The pent up 
denial of rights can sometimes spill over on to the symbolic and political levels in a 
much destructive manner. This is not healthy for any democracy. It allows demagogues Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  14 
and charlatans to symbolically (rather than in substance) address the problems of the 
people. Thus Indian politics in caught in the rhetoric of symbolism, and in the complex 
web of contacts (the actual reality that cuts across party lines). A sustainable but 
expensive democracy results, were (harsh) realities do not matter because they are 
actively kept 'hidden', or ritualised to create sympathy rather than anger, reportage 
rather than analyses, and protest rather than revolution.  
 
 




The archetypal story here is that of Enron which had been dealt with in the last IIR and 
is also covered in this report. But our argument and that of several others including that 
of Sant, Dixit & Wagle (1995) and Abhay Mehta (1881) who perhaps were the first to 
highlight the same, is that the IPP framework (despite the aspect of competitive bidding 
after a few 'fast track projects were pushed through) has been flawed. In the last IIR 
and in the Infranet Conference December 2000 we had called for an immediate ban on 
all further IPPs and a withdrawal of all negotiations then on to bring potential IPPs to 
closure. Instead, we had argued for a true reform based on open access to the 
transmission network and reform of the subsidisation. The details of the governance 
failure in the Enron saga have been brought out in its lurid details by Abhay Mehta 
(1997) whose facts have not been remotely contested even today despite the fact that 
his book has been in circulation for several years now, Subodh Wagle in IIR2002 
(Chapter 6.6) brings out the implications for governance that arise out of the same. 
Here we are interested in drawing attention to a more general phenomenon within 
government of refusing to right staff key organisations and institutions of governance 
causing failure, as a result, and then shrugging away the whole thing as the cost of 
learning. Today lack of professionalism in key regulatory functions obstruct reform. See 




Besides the SEBI, many of the departments of the RBI, the Dept of Banking, the Power 
Ministry, the DFIs and investment banks all need highly specialised knowledge and 
expertise that cannot be brought in by bureaucrats on the move, however clever and 
committed they are
17. The problem of policy making and administration in a phase of 
transition to a liberal economy is perhaps most demanding and crucial. Once a 
successful liberal society has been ushered in the challenge of governance perhaps 
reduces, but till then it is heightened by the need of governments to create and right 
equip the new institutions, create enabling frameworks, such as BOT laws, nudge 
consumer and other watch dog organisations into existence and activity. This entirely 
avoidable failure of government inter alia now threatens the continuation of reforms. 
There have been notable successes such as telecom reform, where the powerful force 
of technology was irresistible and so forgave regulatory mistakes. Ports again have not 
done badly in this regard. Power sector reform has perhaps been the worst victim of 
this kind of failure. 
                                            
17 For governance failures arising inter alia out of lack of specific knowledge and skills 
see Chapter 6.6 by Barua, S.K, IIR2002 Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  15 
 
Private infrastructure could need credit enhancements, and elaborate agreements with 
the state. In some cases such contracts can be used to generate resources for the state 
without hurting the prospects for market development, and the interest of the 
consumer. In other cases such as that of the natural monopoly with little contestability 
and average growth prospects, it would be right for the state to grant subsidies and 
credit enhancements. There is no getting away from the specialised skills - including 
knowledge of the sector - of the law relating to contracts, and technology, as the basis 
for the correct decision making. Where what is desirable and suitable is not easily 
decided. 
 
 'Hiring consultants' or `bidding as a solution' does always work. Consultants' 
knowledge can be very limited, and their best effort would not come forth unless the 
client is knowledgeable and well prepared.
18 Bidding can result in optimal results only if 
the bid process is right structured, and that is not easy. It is not a generalist skill either. 
There are limits to using consultants to right structure bids without a basic knowledge 
of bids and the industry in government departments/authorities. Similarly, decontrol of 
highly regulated sectors is a skill demanding activity, if the creation of vast rents has to 
be avoided. 
 
Distancing from Government 
 
Additionally, as much as the skills and the knowledge, crucial to good governance is 
'distancing' of such regulation, contract designing and policy formulation from the day 
to day affairs of the government. To illustrate the point: The formulation of a draft 
agreement for building sections of highways needs to be carefully done, widely 
circulated and commented upon, cross checked and fully refined before it becomes 
official. But a specific agreement becomes a day to day aspect. There is much potential 
at the design stage to bring about better risk allocation, incentive compatibility, lower 
monitoring costs, and transparency and hence reduce the scope for rents. If the 
prototype of the agreement itself is shoddy then there is the possibility of certain 
developers using the same to their advantage to create rents. Most PPAs and the IPP 
framework have been flawed in this sense. 
 
Distancing Privatisation from Government 
 
Privatisation is one activity though, where the scope for rents is enormous. Rents could 
take many forms and only if the correct counterfactual is posed can the situation be 
recognised as having created rents. Thus delays, interdepartmental wrangling and 
uncertainties, restrictive presale conditions including insistence upon golden shares can 
reduce bid values considerably. Then, after sale, if the new owner is able to get rid of 
government interference, neutralise or do away with the golden share, the rents can be 
large, though this is not evident. The current low values of the stock of PSUs are in part 
a result of confusion with regard to disinvestment. If these are corrected after sale, 
                                            
18 I have been witness to some entirely shoddy work done by consultants of 
international repute, since they knew that their client was ill-equipped to question them, 
and was not familiar with the task and the questions given to the consultants. The 
consultants had been covering up their poor work with jargon until the meeting in which 
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then large value transfers could be said to have taken place even though with reference 
to the market, there may not be even `abnormal' gain to the purchasing party. In the 
Indian context disinvestment would have to be distanced if not separated form the 
government. We had argued in the last IIR for a constitutional or distanced authority 
for disinvestment. This is because the credibility of the government (irrespective of 
which party rules) to carry out disinvestment in a fair and corruption free manner is low 
if not non-existent. This has happened because of 'state-failure' in India, in many of its 
efforts to direct economic activity, and competitive politics with one feeding the other. 
Neither can the route of transparency be an answer, since every aspect of the 
disinvestment process cannot be disclosed. Disinvestment even when by a competent 
body and headed by persons whose credentials are not in doubt, but within 
government, does not carry much credibility. Valuations can always be questioned, and 
no political party, would let an opportunity to question values, go unexploited. 
 
A Core within Government 
 
The tasks of governance and institutional change as we have outlined above require 
that at least some section within the government, for some time, is motivated, 
corruption free, and skillful.  Economic reform has the great advatantage that it does 
not require all of government to be 'good' all the time. That is why reform can be put 
together from within the system if adequate pressure to do so exists. (Such was the 
case in the immediate aftermath of the crisis of 1990-91).  As such the general 
'impotence of the administrative machinery', or the 'system failure' while real, and a 
valid explanation for the ineffectiveness of well meaning officers and politicians
19, need 
not actually  stand in the way of reform. More of the correct reforms such as direct 
subsidies, legal changes that for BOT type participation , freedom of information laws, 
growth oriented macroeconomic policies, the less is the bind of the administration. The 
growth and development effects of reform would in turn, through larger processes, 
bring about changes in governance through the system as a whole. See Box The 
Tragedy of Indian Administration. 
 
 
For such small groups within government, or for regulatory institutions trying to work a 
new sector development , or put together  a framework for public private partnership, 
or writing contracts for the same, or worrying about new frameworks for land 
acquisition, the key to success would be accept compromise solution only when that 
makes sense. Thus whether one chooses cost plus or incentive regulation or 'created' 
markets for generation is not something that is negotiable. The choice should emerge 
out of the 'strategy for change for the country as a whole', that is being pursued. If for 
instance the strategy is largely one of deregulation the understanding that ownership 
changes alone are not adequate ought to follow. And that industry structure and the 
nature of environment for profits is important and the probability of regulatory capture 
                                            
19 Some may contest this and claim that 'system failure' is an excuse to hide one's lack 
of initiative and poor performance. This isno doubt true, but then the implict reference 
for comparison is that only very dynamic and politically savvy manager or officer can 
get things done. Why should the system demand such enterprise out the officer. That 
only confirms that the system has constraints. It is important to realise that this vey fact 
- that only great leaders like V.Krishnamurthy could succeed in Indian PSUs is proof of 
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is high. In such a situation then only created markets wherever feasible and incentive 
elsewhere would be the choice. Cost plus regulation has no place at all. What could 
possibly be negotiated, is the pace of change towards that new industry structure, and 
the treatment of 'stranded assets'. It goes without saying that such key groups and 
institutions have the right skills and the freedom. One of the challenges today is really 
to open up administration to lateral entry of experts so that one does not have to wait 
for the learning with the cadres of the bureaucracy. Lateral recruitment merely for 
advisory capacity foes not help much. 
 
Another attribute of success would have to be the originality to contextualise reform to 
the Indian situation. I had argued for inventive and original solutions. The need to 
deeply understand our own problems, to contextualise our approach (like deregulation) 
even if they are derived from elsewhere had been emphasised. No models that worked 
elsewhere, can on that count alone, be grafted on to the situation here. Experts, 
including transnational consultants may not have all the answers. (Their answers can in 
any case be only as good as the background work done by the 'clients'.) Thus, there is 
need to go beyond the beaten circuits. Thus, 'right structuring' the ownership of difficult 
to regulate business like transmission, the need to be particularly bothered about the 
mode of subsidy administration, to be particularly worried about incentive compatibility 
in proposals for change, to be able to distinguish between political considerations and 
others that are 'politicised' or only a mask for rents, wastage and theft, to recognise the 
limits of government administration and to be alert enough to take advantage of the 
few opportunities for political entrepreneurship, are all integral to getting the 'Second 
Stage' of reforms correct. The special characteristics imposed by late-industrialisation, 
low incomes, income inequality, the opportunities in access subsidisation, rather than 
use-subsidisation, in postponing regulation when high growth and expansionary phase 




We discussed governance, but argued that the `leverage point for change' to improve 
governance would generally lie not in attempting governance improvements in 
government as a whole, but in policies that engender faster growth and development, 
in the removal of removal of restrictions, and in correctly deregulating the economy.  
The basis for the arguments were conceptual, historical and empirical. 
 
 
Today the economy is constrained by conservative monetary (and fiscal) policies and a 
tame pricing of the Indian rupee. Given the large buffer stocks of food, and the very 
high responsiveness of exports to the exchange rate there is scope to raise the growth 
rates substantially. That should be the first task. This point was not argued in this paper 
but mentioned by reference to my paper on the topic (Morris, 1997) which had 
anticipated the current industrial recession and its nature. Many economists have 
misunderstood East Asia 's success to inter alia lie in laissez faire. This is incorrect. It 
lies in export-promotion, the simultaneous promotion of both exports and import 
substitution, possible in a more realistic three commodity model of world trade. The fear 
of inflation and the fiscal deficit getting out of hand is greatly exaggerated. A longer 
term strategy for which there may be political difficulties is land reform which has the 
potential to unlock the constrain of the home  market for the industrialisation of the 
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The second  task is really to right structure the subsidy administration in critical areas : 
electricty, water and petroleum sectors where reform is caught in the bind of  
subsidisation modes. Removal of subsidies would not be the answer since that would 
require prior reform and would be political hara-kiri. In any case that is not necessary 
since the true value of subsidies (in terms of actually delivered benefits to the the 
targetted sector) is quite manageable.  The replacement of current modes that 
generate vast rents and have created vested interests through direct subsidisation is 
possible. In subsidised groups being able to pay with coupons developers and providers 
of the service /product would see uniform prices. Developments in IT, in database 
management and in communication and identification allow the easy identification of 
citizens for the basis of correct administration of subsidies. The task of coupon 
distribution given the entitlement and identification is trivial Even if there are mistakes 
in identification, they are containable, and can be reduced over  a period. Most 
importantly mistakes in identification do not affect reform and the management of 
infrastructural sectors. They can then be reformed quickly. Political support for direct 
subsidisation is likely to be overwhelmingly large, to counter any possible role of vested 
interests. The need today is to urgently drive towards direct subsidisation in electricity, 
kersosene, irrigation water, fertilisers and chemicals. 
 
The third task is more narrowly that of governance and institutional development: The 
economic reforms thus far, have created the space for some governance oriented 
reform to have important impact on the economy. If the second task can be 
simultaneously addressed, then the scope of the changes possible within government 
are very  large. Once the source of nourishment of corruption can be destroyed, the 
business of  improvements in the performance of government as  a whole can be 
addressed. Even before that, in a more limited way, governance can improve if small 
groups within government and regulators can take upon themselves the task of doing 
things the right way: developing drafts for framework legislation like the BOT law, 
setting up of key organisations like the IDecK or GIDB in Karnataka and Gujarat 
respectively, developing the right formats for contracting, creating the space for people 
to directly interact with providers of public services, brining in markets and 
commercialisation wherever possible, and working towards privatisation when state 
owned enterprises are severely constrained by their dysfunctional interface with 
government.  The need to right man and professionalise the new bodies including 
regulatory commissions is obvious. Society has paid too high a price in the poor 
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BOX: INSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS FOR PSU MANAGEMENT FAIL 
 
MOUs Fail 
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In the area of public sector management, (which is recognised as a major aspect 
requiring governance related assistance, by the World Bank and others), measures such 
as the 'holding company' or the 'MoU' (Memorandum of Understanding) got entirely 
ritualised
20. They ended up becoming an added expense and a distraction and did not in 
any way reduce government's dysfunctional interference in companies (the original 
purpose of the MoU). The reasons for such a pass are well known: Until the budgetary 
squeeze on the PSUs, there was little need for any of those in positions of decision 
making to change. The dysfunctional interface allowed displacement of responsibility, 
provided for 'hidden budgets' for the politician to use, reduced the challenge for senior 
managers, allowed workers high wages and security with very little work, and to even 
translate their vast bargaining power into idle time.  And the private industries that 
benefited out of the relatively low prices of PSU products could not complain. The MoU 
over the late eighties and early nineties had got reduced to a 'complex document' 
crafted by the 'Adhoc Committee' within the Department of Public Enterprise, in 
consultation with the enterprise and low level functionaries of the administrative 
ministries. They were evaluated by a "High Powered Committee", which could never 
have had the time. The entire exercise was purely formal. The essential seriousness 
attached to an important contract was not there. They were seen more as an academic 
exercise than as a binding contract. No rewards and punishments were attached to 
either performance or adherence, or to their lack. It was not in any way negotiated. 
Soft targeting was rampant. And it is doubtful if any of the administrative ministries 
thought of themselves as being constrained by the MoUs. Yet MoUs spread like wild fire 
and nearly all PSUs today go through a MoU annually. We have, what the French have 
most effectively used, viz the contract form to distance the PSUs from government, but 
sadly only on paper.  
 
So do Holding Companies 
 
Earlier we had started with another form the 'holding company' to create behemoths 
like the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), Bharat Bari Udyog Limited (BBUL). SAIL 
was the creation of the late Mohan Kumaramangalam, the dynamic young steel minister 
who, in being close to the Prime Minister Ms Gandhi could cut through red tape. He was 
particularly enamoured by Fabian socialism and the Italian holding companies. During 
his leadership SAIL did manage some autonomy, but since his death, SAIL has been a 
curious and tragic mix of a bureaucracy and a 'managerial hierarchy', that is parasitic on 
the steel plants at Bhilai, Bokaro and elsewhere. The reform of SAIL would mean that 
not only government gets off the back of the steel plants, but even the top heavy SAIL 
head office is wound up. SAIL had the ridiculous distinction of employing 220 thousand 
people to produce some 8 million tonnes of steel, when Pohang Steel of South Korea 
(POSCO) could produce the same with just 13000 people, PIB a Millstone!  
 
Similarly, in a still earlier period organisations like the Project Implementation Board 
(PIB) set up within the Planning Commission to coordinate the investment decisions of 
the PSUs, ended up to become a millstone round their necks. In its own direct actions 
the PIB may have been responsible for much of the delays and cost overruns in public 
sector projects. The Planning Commission itself is an organisation that ritually plans, 
when government itself hardly takes these plans seriously. 
                                            
20 This is now well accepted. For a discussion on why MoUs (as also holding companies 






BOX: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
There have been significant improvements in well being since Independence though 
nowhere near the progress made by East Asia and China. When the British left us our 
average life expectancy was just 37 years. (Habib, Irfan, 1975) for the country as a 
whole. This means that vast numbers of the very poor (peasants) in Bengal, Bihar, 
Orissa, Eastern UP and Telengana would have had life expectancies no more than 25 
years! A figure lower than that of Neanderthal man. Today life expectancy is nearly 60 
years in some states.  
 
 
What has been the Source of this Progress? 
 
Much of it has come from technological developments in vaccines (vaccine programmes 
can be administered even in situations of state failure), in antibiotics (especially cheap), 
and in some improvements in diet especially on account of the milk, vegetables and 
eggs revolutions. Per head grain intake has gone up very little or has remained static if 
some of our food statisticians have to be believed. Even accounting for increased 
calorific intake due to potatoes in eastern India, it is unlikely that food intake has shown 
anywhere near the kind of improvement (from a better base) that East Asia has shown. 
That marginal improvement in food intake (without any imports) would not have been 
possible without the HYV revolution, again largely technological and amenable to 
programme mode of extension without major demands on design of organisations, is 
worth noting. Public services continue to remain of abysmal quality and poor coverage, 
and may even have shown an overall deterioration in quality as these were over 
ambitiously sought to be spread.  
Similarly, social movements have had durable effects on the society and the economy. 
These include the  'Non-Brahmin' movements of Southern India, including the Ezahava 
Rebellion in Kerala, the movement for the upliftment for lower castes and women by 
people like Jyotiba Phule and Ambedkar in Maharashtra, and 'sankritisation' processes in 
so far as they lead to lower castes valuing education. 
 
Micro-intervention of State has Failed 
 
Microeconomic efforts at redistribution
21, by the state, began with vehemence since the 
stagnation of the mid-sixties, and has continued with increased emphasis ever since. 
This 'massive' redistributive effort has colored and determined the very functioning of 
the government and the bureaucracy. Income distribution though has remained as 
skewed as ever. The proportion of the people below the poverty line is still explained 
best by the rate of growth in the preceding years, especially of agriculture. Action and 
organisation for redistribution on the part of the state has become an end in itself with 
the result being of no consequence. Thus all these programmes spew out impressive 
'results' which are defined in terms of expenditures (input measures) rather than effects 
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(output measures
22).  Their real purpose we had mentioned earlier was to 'buy up 
dissent' and create the space for an expanding bureaucracy. Vast rents were no doubt 
generated in the leakages.  We have already seen that those economies that carried out 
a one shot (and economy wide) redistribution of productive assets through land reforms 
(essentially a political and macro process) have avoided altogether any continual 
redistribution on the part of the state. Thereby, they have been able to keep their state 
apparatus relatively lean and focussed on the task of industrial development.  
 
Macro Programmes  
 
In contrast to micro intervention for redistribution, productively oriented public 
investments, especially in irrigation, but also in the HYV programme, in higher education 
and in primary education (to the extent this could be sustained) have had important 
effects. Similarly successful mega-programmes such as operation flood, and macro 
efforts such as price support for food production (given the demand constraint for food) 
and subsidies (despite the waste) have had measurable impacts. Subsidies have also 
dysfunctionally helped to create rents, which have over a period taken the form of 
'directly unproductive activities' 
23. We will return to the rents created by subsidies, 
more correctly to the mode of administration of subsidies, shortly.  
 
The criticality of the growth of agriculture to the growth of the rest of the economy is 
not adequately appreciated. Agriculture and exports explain best the non-agricultural 
private sector GDP in comparative studies (Morris, 1997). More importantly today (since 
the mid-seventies) agricultural growth is constrained by inadequate demand requiring 
therefore a vast `buffer' stocking. The only way the demand can come is by the poor 
peasant being unshackled enough to increase his output so that in producing he 
automatically creates demand. Only this can lead to a quick relaxation of the home 
market contract for manufacturers. 
 
Thus land reform, major income redistribution through massive food for work 
programmes in the Indian context today are the key issues that need resolution
24. To 
discard the present (conservative) regime of macro-economic management for another 
more ambitious and expansionary is a live issue. The potential benefits in aggressive 
pricing of the currency and in interest rate targeting, if carefully managed are many. 
The high growth that it can bring, possibility in excess of 9%, would be exhilarating. I 
would be the only way, not only to grow out of the current recession and the fiscal 
mess, but also go give the economy and society a fair chance to make its industrial 





BOX: THE TRAGEDY OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
                                            
22 For a brief review of such programmes see Das, K. in Chapter 7.1 in IIR2002. 
23 A term due to Jagdish Bhagawati. 
24 Those are not excluded given the class basis of society, and of the state today. Land 
reforms as a capitalist strategy that enhances the home market, and embeds the 
institution of private property are feasible, if the Indian bourgeoisie can `think big' to 
ensure its long term interests. Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  23 
 
There is no civil service training programme that I have yet conducted without the civil 
servant blaming the politician. My standard argument against the futility and error in 
such blame which has never failed to enliven the debate is to show the 'intellectual' 
failure in many policies such as the export pessimism of Mahalanobis, in the mode of 
subsidisation in many areas, in Indian reformers having read export led growth as 
laissez faire under World Bank tutelage, etc. so as to open the civil servants' mind to 
failures other than that due to vested interests or the 'politician'. And then to argue how 
many of the politicians and the dysfunctional interests they represent are very much the 
creation of past policy failure. Allied to these arguments I bring out the vacuousness of 
the often made statement "good policy but poorly implemented", to argue as in 
IIR2001, why that is a contradiction in terms - a good policy implements itself.  
 
Mixed Up Powers 
 
I go on to then argue why the Indian system is most failure prone: It is well known to a 
student of government that when executive decisions are the sole preserve of either a 
'bureaucracy' (career bureaucrats in office), or that of elected politicians with clear 
demarcation responsibilities, of roles and then the outcomes in terms of governance 
and economic administration, have been far better than when both are together 
involved. The details of the Indian system are worth recounting from the bottom up. 
The lowest and perhaps most crucial levels of government (from the point of view of 
economic services provision) are the urban local bodies (nagarpallikas) and the village 
(gram) panchayats. They were always there but could never function effectively. It was 
hoped in a manner similar to that between the centre and the states, if the state could 
legislate the powers of the local bodies then things would begin to move in the direction 
of effective decentralisation and hence effective local administration. Much hope was 
placed on the 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments that legislated the powers and 
functions of the rural and urban local bodies respectively. But that, it was soon realised, 
made no difference, since in any case local bodies had little fiscal resources of their own 
and depended much on the state government for much of their funds (see Mathur 
(2001)). It was again hoped that with financial devolution as laid out by the state 
financial commissions would result in autonomy and meaningful responsibility for local 
public services to local bodies. In many states the devolution has yet to be notified. 
What is more interesting is that even where they have been, the results are not 
encouraging. The local bodies continue much as before, superceded for all practical 
purposes by state governments, officials and departments that work locally (Nanavati, 
A. (2000). This has happened because the bureaucracy in India is a true hierarchically 
ordered tree with no breaks to accommodate elected executives. Thus the talati and 
other clerks and junior officers view their senior officers at the district and state levels 
and not the panchayat president as their masters. Had the link in the chain of command 
been broken at all levels where elected representatives were in executive positions, the 
embedding of responsibility would have been possible. Organisationally, most 
functionaries are being asked to serve two 'masters', when only one (the higher ranked 
official) is far more real, especially at the local level.  
 
Strangely in having the IAS and other central services as a national cadre, the 
bureaucratic chain is not broken even at the level of the state, thereby denying the 
states (through the organisational aspect), much of the powers (and independence) 
they ought to possess under the Constitution. But the problem is far more serious at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  24 
level of local governments, where there is much displacement of responsibility: The 
elected representatives cannot be held accountable since they have no power over the 
officers and staff of the local body, and the bind of processes and rules can reduce 
them to impotence. The little financial autonomy they have compounds the problem 
further. The government employees on the other hand can hardly be made answerable 
to people. Elected representatives are at best able to influence the selection of 
beneficiaries of programmes pre-decided at the central or state levels. Or be able to 
chose the site of a bore well given that the state government or its parastatals have a 
bore well programme. Design, and planning which start with the local problems of 
nagarpallikas is hardly possible. Local elections are highly politicised. This is entirely 
dysfunctional because local issues dominate the world of the citizen especially rural and 
small town. The politicisation then becomes the excuse to tie the hands of the elected 
representatives in a maze of processes and rules. Similarly, the fear that panchayats 
may not adequately represent vulnerable castes, becomes an excuse to effectively 
bypass them in all targetted economic programmes
25. In that situation it is natural that 
the elected representatives turn to nepotism and graft. The scope for building political 
capital through good performance of the local bodies they head or are elected to is 
therefore limited. So what else can they do? The bureaucracy arranges for the graft, 
partakes in the same, and the system continues to exist and thrive at the cost of the 
people as a whole. So what systemic functionality do local bodies have? The 
expenditure on local bodies is not inconsiderable, and salaries and related 
administrative expenses could absorb the bulk of their total expenditure. Therefore local 
governments of all but the larger towns may be nothing more than job creation by an 
expanding bureaucracy. And election of representatives in politicising local opinion, 
deflects them from economic failure, by giving local leadership some participation in the 
`spoils' of governance. Their potential to do good though is high if the local 
bureaucracy can be made entirely answerable to the local elected representatives. Costs 
could go down dramatically, employment could then be more need and local 
requirement based rather than being derived from the rule book, and elected members 
would be empowered to be responsible. They and others would not be able to able to 
pass the buck.  
 
Colonial Origins of the 'System' 
 
The origins of such a debilitating design lie in colonial rule. The reality of (British) Indian 
administration and governance was the governor general and the administrative 
bureaucracy that he commanded. The last authority in this hierarchy was the talati. As 
the pressures for popular government emerged (the reason for the freedom struggle) 
the British as early as in 1935 created legislatures at the provincial level with ministers 
and other elected officials, headed by Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. This is no substantial way 
diluted the powers of the governors and governor general. In such crucial dimensions of 
administration as the police, or district administration they retained complete control. 
With independence while power over policy and law making shifted to the elected 
representatives, at the state and central levels the executive power is still shared 
                                            
25 In many parts of the country but especially in the South and the West, which have 
seen as neodicum of development, lower castes can no longer be systematically 
excluded by panchayats. In most situations that require the village as a whole to have 
an opinion, as in issues relating to displacement, natural disasters, road building, 
representative groups that include all castes have begun to emerge. Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  25 
between career bureaucrats, and elected officials. Only those politicians with great 
leadership skills and a natural flair for administration have typically been able to 
exercise their power in a positive manner. At the local level, where there is no 
legislative role, and little or no policy making, executive power is the key, which is 
certainly not in the hands of the elected representatives. It may possibly also not 
effectively be with the local officials since they could in turn be constrained by their own 
deep hierarchy, rule orientation, and also by the dysfunctional role of the elected 
representatives. The collector remains the key authority at the district level and certain 
changes in the law such as the 73
rd Amendment and the Land Acquisition Bill have only 
increased his powers. Such structures which obfuscate, and cannot allow for 
responsibility assignment can therefore hardly be transparent or held accountable. Poor 
governance is therefore one of design but has its base in history. And its continues 
because of elitist character of administration and society. 
 
Of 'Knights in Shining Armour' 
 
Many capable bureaucrats (probably the best of the lot) revel in fixing problems. They 
are the means by which a minimum functionality of the system is ensured. They are its 
'knights in shining armour'. They need the problems, as much as the vested interests 
who gain from the governance failures. They are shifted around when their activities 
become `too hot' for the system. They are also sent in when things go awfully wrong 
(revealed as such) and have to be fixed or set right. They are usually incorruptible, 
clever, highly motivated individuals, with boundless energy. Unlike the 'impotently 
honest' bureaucrat they are able to take things forward by attacking 'solvable 
problems'. They have a particular knack for finding such problems, however 
uninteresting their posting. They also have a tolerance for very large and very small 
failures. Thus, they are not reduced to impotence within the corrupt system. They are 
also able to get lower down functionaries, even corrupt ones, to work to their own 
plans. They may even look the other way in the face of petty corruption of their 
subordinates, for overcoming the larger problem. They see every problem as something 
that must be actively corrected. They are incapable of admitting systemic limitations. To 
them the solution to all problems is for many more to be like them. That the system can 
have properties other than that of its individuals (holistic aspects or in a more limited 
way the idea of the fallacy of composition), has no place in their minds. They express a 
truism that if all were like themselves then there would not be any failure. To some of 
them, who have an extreme action orientation, all change follows from things that have 
to be got done. "Implementation (because people like them are scarce) failure is the 
key." Notions of incentive compatibility, functionality of the systems of rewards and 
punishments are an anathema for their kind of minds. Change as arising out of social 
movements is also alien to them. Some of them though may see the general solution to 
lie in `reforms of education' inculcating values, and such other homilies. Change to 
them is what they and other energetic officers (and possibly some politicians) like them 
bring about. When they leave (or as is more likely are asked to leave), their good work 
inevitably collapses, or degrades after a while. Their stories of success when narrated at 
the dinner table can be very inspiring to all present, and may well lull us into the belief 
that with such knights, even if very few, around, things could not go really wrong. A 
few may even be able to get into the limelight to become 'icons' for the mass media and 
the middle class. 
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Yet, the more durable change can come from the 'alchemist' who understands the 
system and sees his role as not that of a doer but as one who needs to release or allow 
pent up forces to act. Such a bureaucrat or a politician (more usually the latter) sees 
policy not as something that needs to be implemented but implements itself. He would 
have no action stories to tell, probably only 'boring' stuff about a particular rule or law, 
and may appear to be too academic. Unfortunately, his tribe is rarer than that of the 
knights. Such `alchemists' would have less romantic notions of their own roles and 
class, see themselves as ordinary individuals in a situation, where the best explanation 
(in the average sense) for the bureaucrat's' (or politician's) behaviour is the situation he 
is placed in. Most bureaucrats who blame the system are not necessarily able to 
articulate the problem and put their fingers to the leverage point for change, be it a 
law, a rule that requires change, or a price distortion that needs to be removed. The 
time to ponder and arrive at such deeper understanding is denied to them. In order to 
be not too far away from the career path even those who sense the systemic nature of 
the problem are forced to live in the day to day. Over a period they come to assume 
that it is 'committees and expert groups' (and today consultants) who should do the 
thinking. As such open thinking within the system is itself muted.  
 
And Yet Impotence 
 
A few of the `alchemists' who are able to find time to think may also end up being 
'incapacitated'. Freeing them is today, an important aspect of change. Armed with a 
degree (sometimes even a Ph.D.) is disciplines like economics, management of 
government from good universities they monopolise the entire thinking within the 
government. Their skills in being able to put out the first draft for any paper gives them 
the advantage over the 'knights in armour'. Their importance is particularly enhanced 
when 'reform is on' since that is the time for these papers, framework documents, 
drafts and white papers. Unfortunately, exceptions apart, their knowledge and 
understanding while very expansive may not be deep enough and may only be what is 
the current fashion in a school or an institution abroad. There is little dialogue among 
them, since they are only the last leaves of the intellectual enterprise whose roots, and 
big branches are in the west. In areas which require specialised knowledge - electricity 
reform, revamping financial markets, monitoring banks, macro management of the 




Even that inadequacy may not be the main problem of the system. The process of 
consensus building around the draft that goes on, usually kills the functionality of the 
final version that goes on to become the policy or the law. The 'coherence' of a 
particular approach is then lost. This, is akin to the foolish couple who spend the 
evening on the road in their car because they could not decide one way or the other - 
whether to go the theatre or to stay at home. Such 'compromise' papers are usually 
fatally flawed, and yet get pushed with the vigour that arises out of the bureaucratic 
and political processes that they would have gone through
26. And then to kill that bad 
                                            
26 Practically, every major initiative, the BOT laws of state governments, the 
modifications to the Electricity Acts that created the regulators, the TRAI, the now 
pending Draft 2001 Bill on Electricity have been victims of this tendency. It was only the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  27 
idea becomes a tough task for those than come in a little later and have to own up to 
the dysfunctionalities created by the very same policy or law
27. So even the 'alchemists' 
who could have been agents of remain constrained. 
 
Had the process of consensus building or compromise been in situations where 
compromise is possible (where for instance continuously varying solutions on some 
relevant dimension exists), and had the process been truly reflective of the interests of 
different segments of society, there would still have been some progress. To give an 
example: the mode of subsidisation of electricity is not something that is to be decided 
on the basis of 'bargaining' or consensus. That has to be a 'technical' decision. To 
assume that it can be negotiated is to presume that thieves and rent seekers are 
sections of the interest groups. On the other hand the criteria for identification of the 
amount of entitlement (i.e. whether it ought to be largely a production, or an income 




BOX : CREATING GOVERNANCE FAILURE IN THE OIL SECTOR 
 
Subsidisation and Adulteration 
 
In 1979, after the second oil shock, retail prices of petroleum products were increased 
through the imposition of heavy duties. The need to cushion the shock on diesel and 
kerosene arose. Farmers were important users of diesel, and many poor households 
used kerosene. Soon enough, the tax demands on the sector and the cross 
subsidisation within the sector grew. By the late eighties the final price of petrol was 
way above that of other fuels. Till recently the price ratio between petrol and diesel was 
as high as 3:1, that between petrol and naphtha perhaps higher, and that with 
kerosene in the range of 4:1. Even a 10% adulteration of petrol with naphtha or certain 
solvents including benzenes generates stupendous 'profits' in relation to the `contract' 
profits in the retailing business. The government pushes contracts (on paper) on to 
retail oil dealers that are so finely calculated that returns (for honest dealers) higher 
than about 16% on assets are not possible
28. But ' honest' dealers are a rarity today.  
 
Dealer Section Board 
 
Companies never have had the autonomy in the selection of dealers. Even today they 
do not have this freedom. There is a "Dealer Selection Board" whose criteria for 
selection of dealers has nothing to do with the potential to perform well in the retail 
business. The Board itself is highly politicised. Why should a business that can give only 
modest profits be so much in demand? Most dealers are politically connected; some 
                                                                                                                              
great technological dynamism of the telecom market, that was able to force changes to 
overcome the debilitating provisions of the earlier TRAI Act. See Jain, Rekha (2000) in 
the last IIR. Varma, Jayanth  (2001) in Chapter 6.1 IIR2002brings out the fatal flaws in 
this `half way house', in private financing.  
27 Thus today reformers would have to `kill the IPP provisions', the idea of subvertions, 
extra charges on transmission usage as a cross subsidisation devices. 
28 Are margins purposefully kept low to keep out good people? Many managers claim 
that this is indeed so! Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  28 
may be only a front for small time politicians. Dealerships are seen as payoffs at the 
lower levels of the political system. There are of course the usual reservations for ex-
soldiers, handicapped people, depressed castes, freedom fighters, and other worthy 
citizens. But barring a few, most such allotees are merely 'fronts' for the real operators. 
Such operators control many outlets. Corruption is rampant and the marketing 
departments of oil companies cannot avoid being involved. The extent of corruption 
varies much across regions. It is generally believed that petrol on highways, and more 
generally in the north and in Gujarat the extent of adulteration/short selling is more.  
 
'Innovations' in Adulteration 
 
Benzenes, naphtha, other solvents, and certain additives to keep the anti-knocking 
properties of the fuel within the range required for IC-engines with ignition, are used. 
'R&D' takes place in the small scale industry to develop such additives.  
 
Even in the lubricants trade there is major adulteration of oils especially 2T oils with 
improperly recycled oil. A licensed small industry has come up to extract the base oil 
from used lubricants. But instead of doing just that, they manufacture lubricants with 
improper additives. Even the extraction processes are not good enough to completely 
remove the metal residues in used lubricants. But there is a ready and lucrative market 
for such oils in the unscrupulous retail outlets and road side garages that service two 
wheelers. Branded pouches introduced by the oil companies have not restored any 
confidence. The informal sector has responded with their pouches that often copy those 
of the oil companies. Since the freeing of lubricants from the administered price 
mechanism, specialist lubricant 'super markets' located all over and (significantly) away 
from fuel outlets have come up. They do a roaring business because nobody trusts 
retail outlets to sell clean lubricants, and the advertisements of the oil companies may 
have helped to build the scare and the consciousness.  
 
Created Negative 'Externality' 
 
The consumer of petroleum products due to adulteration and short measuring bear 
large private costs. Loss of engine power and life, more frequent maintenance and 
considerable drop in mileage are obvious effects. The social costs are enormous. When 
kerosene and solvents are used, the amount of unburnt residues and monoxide in the 
exhaust are at least an order of magnitude more than when clean petrol is used. Many 
of the solvents and benzenes being hetero-cyclical are highly carcinogenic. It is quite 
likely that in cities like Ahmedabad, where benzenes and kerosene levels in the air are 
high enough to be actually smelt, the risk of cancer that the people bear is alarming 
and higher than in exposed industrial places. Mere reporting of SO2 levels, as is done by 
the media in their pollution watch, completely misses this pollution. Despite MPFI, Euro 
-II and all that, all cities continue to be highly polluted due to adulteration. Indeed so 
rampant is the adulteration that a special 'auto-fuel' is available on the streets of 
Ahmedabad, at a fraction of the price of regular petrol. This is a mixture of petrol, 
benzene and possibly naphtha that makes each autorickshaw a pollution bomb. The 
tragedy is that this pollution is not an externality, of some other activity that is adding Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  29 
positive benefits elsewhere. It is crime that results in negative value addition
29. It is 
entirely avoidable. It is a direct result of ham-handed policy.  
 
Why Companies Cannot do Much 
 
The government thinks that the oil companies are responsible and advise them to police 
the retail distribution business. The oil companies throw up their hands, since they have 
no control over the dealers. Dealers would never admit to adulteration. They have a 
strong association, and when individual cases of adulteration are taken up occasionally 
by the oil companies, nothing finally happens. After a great deal of effort in proving 
adulteration or short measuring the fine/punishment is too small. Based on the numbers 
of dealers actually caught adulterating or short measuring, the lowest estimate of the 
numbers of retail outlets involved is at least a third, in the best of the nationalised oil 
companies. In the others it is probably much worse. So what do the managers in the 
marketing departments really do? The rookies try to do something, fail, and ask for 
different postings.  
 
I am told an interesting story by one such `rookie', who is today a senior manager, who 
finally opted out of marketing because he could not bear to be impotent in the face of 
this systematic assault on the consumer, and on the interest of the company. In one 
South Indian city, where citizen awareness of the ill effects of adulterated fuel is 
somewhat greater than elsewhere, he launched a campaign, following two cases of 
adulteration and short measuring that was discovered by the company. The action 
against the two outlets was the severest possible under the rules. Their license was 
suspended for a while, and citizens were told, why the retail outlets were closed, and 
also informed about the campaign against adulteration. The local company officials 
were able to withstand all political pressures, but the sales of the company went down, 
because now consumers knew for certain that petrol had been and therefore probably 
was bad from that company. But other companies who had equally bad if not worse 
                                            
29 In highly corrupt and poorly coordinated societies like India the notions of 'rent' and 
'directly unproductive activities' may not be adequate to understand the economic 
effects of certain activities. Thus, when as a result of corruption in government 
purchase, the official earns rents then it is only in a static, ceterius paribus sense that 
we may see it as unintended redistribution. Other effects that follow are the second 
order effects in the rents having contributed to raising the 'effective price' of the 
product being purchased. Now if the official and his establishment work hard to 
obfuscate, to create processes that are responsibility displacing, (where attribution of 
blame is difficult), then all that work instead of being directly unproductive (wasteful) is 
actually 'negative'. The feed back effects of the same on the system can be enormous. 
So-called vigilance agencies then have to work harder. They could over a period of time 
have developed processes to give the semblance of being active (putting out a few 
cases of anti-corruption) while letting most others go. Their role then becomes one of 
keeping the system of rents getting out of hand. Thus it adds negative value to the 
economy, rather than being merely unproductive. In the last IIR (Gupta, Amita and 
Sebastian Morris, Chapter 5.5) brought out the case of wanton deterioration that 
creates the scope for further maintenance activity on public roads. When railway 
projects are delayed, resulting in earthworks being washed away with the monsoon and 
have to be done all over again, the processes that delay may be seen as cause resulting 
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retail outlets benefited out of the demand shift. Petrol quality is not easily measured at 
the retail level. 
 
 'Managing' Corruption 
 
Most get 'wiser' and though not necessarily personally corrupt, get around to 'managing' 
the corruption rather than stamping out the same. They help to keep the adulteration to 
'within limits', open new (suboptimal from a national or company point of view) 
'company outlets' to check adulteration. How have consumers responded? In the case 
where the rents have been in part passed on to the consumers (as in the case of auto 
owners in Ahmedabad), they too benefit but create huge social costs. Motorists, 
especially those with high performance modern engines go through that awful 
experience of adulterated petrol, talk to others with experience and get around to 
finding the one dealer who does not adulterate, and hopefully there would be at least 
one in every city. Variation in the sales between dealers can be very high. Thus in 
Ahmedabad the one outlet in the city that does not adulterate (besides company pumps 
that are not conveniently located) sells as much petrol as 25% of the total sales of 
petrol in the city by all outlets of the same oil company! Consumers with incomplete 
information are subject to great stress. Others journey long distance to inappropriately 
located outlets where they think they can get good petrol.  
 
Today, we have reached a situation of an outlet every few score kilometres on the 
highways, and every other street corner in the city, and still there is no good fuel to be 
had! Yet, all these outlets, some of them with sales as low as 80 klpm apparently make 
money since so much bribe is paid or influence used to get these outlets. Marketing 
jobs ('dipstick mending') in oil companies as it used to be called then) in the mid-
eighties, used to be prized jobs. The reasons then, were the potential to make a little 
'extra' through the temperature and other variances. (They are probably prized jobs 
now since they oversee points of huge rent generation.) So change cannot come from 
within the system. Consumers as usual do not have the necessary 'leadership 
institutions' to argue their case. Oil companies pin their hopes on the abolition of the 
dealer selection board, in the post Administered Price Mechanism (APM) scenario. That 
may help in the selection of new dealers. But already the retail business is overcrowded, 
and in any conceivable rational reorganisation of the same, many would have to be 
closed as competitive margins and pricing emerges. (Unless adulteration and short 
measuring continues which for the business has the effect of upping the margins and 
creating over entry). 
 
So how can one control and manage a set of dealers who have been reared in 
corruption? Would establishment of private sector oil distributing companies (or 
privatisation of the oil sector) help? In a limited way they could if the private companies 
are allowed to use price to signal quality. Then the consumer would have to pay high 
prices, the difference between the price of good petrol and bad petrol being a return to 
asymmetric information for the oil company. Socially, this is suboptimal. The oil 
company too bears an unnecessary cost of managing two different types of outlets, and 
ensuring that 'adulteration' does not occur in the 'high priced' segment of the business . 
Unlike the public company it would have a motivation to internalise the benefits of 
adulteration, and sometimes to stop the same if the company's reputation is directly 
linked to its behaviour. But the 'temptation to adulterate once a name has been 
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punitive measures by the government or a regulator are likely to become credible 
against a private company, than a public one, since any displacement of responsibility 
has necessarily to be contained within the private company. 
 
Distortions Breed Further Distortions 
 
Privatisation or not, no real solution is not possible, unless the vast differences in prices 
are eliminated. In the current situation of vast differences in prices, only very heavy 
punitive measures, with a large probability of getting caught would help. (If one is small 
the other has to high). Thus, something close to ten years imprisonment may perhaps 
work. But that alas would do violence to all that we know and derive from our Judeo-
Christian notions of jurisprudence. (Even though in any social cost benefit analysis such 
measures would be amply justified). Any attempt to 'solve' the problem without 
correcting the price difference in the first place, (unless of the stiff punitive type 
mentioned above) would only compound the problem and create other unanticipated 
problems or distortions. The 'solution' of a company owned and operated outlet that is 
currently being pursued could add to the costs of distribution, if the employees of the ' 
labour contractor' were to successfully put pressure for regular employment within the 
company, and get the courts on their side. It also adds to an already overextended 
retail outlet network. Elaborate testing machines to ensure quality also add to cost.
30 
Besides testing equipments, tamper proofing comes at a high capital cost usually not 
justified given the Indian factor price ratios. In any case if tests are not going to be 
used to punish, they become mere rituals or irritants, as the current PUC (Pollution 
Under Control) certificates in most cities have become. Value creation at retail outlets 
through groceries and medicines dispensation is no compensation and would not work if 
the core product remains a problem. 
 
Created Vested Interests 
 
A little over a year back, there was what seemed like an effort to correct the mess. The 
so called 'Solvent Scam' surfaced, to reveal that vast quantities of 'solvents' including 
benzene and naphtha ostensibly supplied for industrial use were diverted to adulterate 
petrol. What were remarkable was the huge quantities involved, and the wide extent of 
the operations that spanned over five states. The kingpin was a Guarat based 
'entrepreneur' who had organised the entire business, and had the backing of highly 
placed politicians, excise officials and possibly managers in the petrochemical plants. 
The evidence against him was very strong, and well built up by the Oil Company that 
was keen to make a serious effort to stop the mess of adulteration. The usual methods 
of destroying and falsifying evidence somehow did not work in this case. But the 
business had its supporters among the political bigwigs. A 'counter-case' against the 
Company was filed. Police brought forth evidence that diesel meant for industrial 
application (which had a lower price) was being diverted for use in the transport sector. 
Oil company officials were quickly arrested and jailed. Bails were denied and the 
personal harassment of the officials began. The best efforts of the company to get the 
officials released were of no avail. The company's argument, which had much logic, was 
that they had been selling diesel to firms who had been granted licenses for lower 
                                            
30 Absolute assurance of non-adulteration is possible only with the installation of octane, 
and cetane testers for petrol and diesel respectively and other instruments, which are 
very expensive.    Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (WP No.2001/10/01, Sebastian Morris)  32 
priced diesel by the Excise Department. Was the Excise Department working hand in 
glove with these 'benami' firms to take advantage of the price difference? Then there 
was little that company officials could have done. They (the company) claimed that they 
were neither an investigating agency nor the police. The final outcome is not known. 




In Delhi, when confronted with pollution even after Euro-II norms were introduced for 
car engines
31, a large part of it being due to adulterated fuel use, instead of going for 
low sulphur diesel in combination with modern diesel engines, 4-stroke engines for two 
wheelers and autos, we picked CNG
32. One of the reasons cited by the environmental 
pressure groups is that, being gaseous, it cannot be adulterated. In other words implicit 
admission that nothing can be done about rampant adulteration! If CNG really goes 
ahead in a big way we would have imposed a huge and avoidable cost on the economy. 
The correct solution would have been as stated above and to overcome the problem of 
adulteration through removal of the incentive in the price distortions for adulterating, 
with stiff punitive measures. (Allowing the oil companies to do so). The matter of 
subsidisation of those who use diesel and kerosene could have been easily covered 
through direct subsidisation, not too different from the direct subsidisation in the case 
of electricity. To us it is amazing that none of the actors, the government, the politician 
representing farmers, the oil companies, nor citizen's groups have actively argued for 
the case of direct subsidisation. 
 
 
                                            
31 Which in itself was a success, See Pundir (2000). 
32 See BP Pundir's article in IIR2002 Chapter 5.6. 